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Private Pathologies and Public Policies:
Race, Class, and the Failure of Child Welfare
Charlton C. Copelandt
Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare. By Dorothy Roberts.' New
York: Basic Civitas Books, 2002. Pp. x + 341. $27.50 cloth.
As scholars and journalists focus their attention on the problems of racial
profiling, increased incarceration among young black men, and their effects on
the larger black community,' Professor Dorothy Roberts calls our attention to
the intersections of race and gender in modem interactions with the child wel-
fare system. In an earlier work, Killing the Black Body,2 Roberts called us to
think about how black women had become ensnared in the war on drugs, and
its impact on racial equality and reproductive liberty. In her latest work, Shat-
tered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare,3 Roberts issues a clarion call for so-
ciety to take seriously the issues of race, gender, and class in the child welfare
system's removal of a startling number of black children from their families
and communities. In a stirring indictment of the child welfare system as a "rac-
ist institution, '  which "disrupts, restructures, and polices Black families,
5
Roberts calls for the abolition of the system "we now call child protection and
[its replacement] with a system that really promotes children's welfare.
' 6
Roberts's central purpose is to "provide the missing voice of Black families
t J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2002; M.A.R., Yale Divinity School, 2002; B.A., Amherst
College, 1996. For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I thank Preston Hopson and
Aaron Walker. This essay, such as it is, is dedicated to Hattie Williams Spears.
I Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School.
1. E.g., MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT:
RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); Farah Brelvi, Un-American Activities: Racial
Profiling and the Blacklash After Sept. 11, 48 FED. LAWYER 69 (2001); D.J. Silton, U.S. Prisons and
Racial Profiling. A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53 (2002);
Madeline Baro Diaz, Muslims: Incidents of Bias Go Unreported; Community Leaders Discuss Post-
Sept.-11 Discrimination, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, March 27, 2002, at 5B; Black Drug Offender Sen-
tences Up, THE CAPITAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at 4A; Graig Garretson, Black Groups Urge Swift End to
Racial Profiling Lawsuit, CN. POST, March 27, 2002, at IA; Wendy Ruderman, N.J Withholding
Controversial Profiling Study, THE RECORD, March 26, 2002, at A3.
2. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY (1998) [hereinafter BLACK BODY].
3. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) [hereinafter
SHATTERED BONDS].
4. Id. at 99.
5. Id. at viii.
6. Id. at x.
Yale Law & Policy Review
torn apart by discriminatory and misguided policies" by "developing a new
case for protecting Black families against state intrusion" based on the rights of
parents, children, and "the Black community as a whole." 7 The government's
destruction of black families, argues Roberts, "cause[s] serious group-based
harms by reinforcing disparaging stereotypes about Black family unfitness and
need for white supervision, by destroying a sense of family autonomy and self-
determination among Black Americans, and by weakening Blacks' collective
ability to overcome institutionalized discrimination."
8
The argument in Shattered Bonds follows the model of Killing the Black
Body, in which Roberts analyzed both historical and present-day threats to
black women's reproductive freedom. In that text, Roberts examined the con-
nection between threats to black reproductive autonomy and white supremacy.
She argued that the regulation of black women's reproductive decisions had
been a "central aspect of racial oppression," and that black women's lack of re-
productive freedom "has shaped the meaning of reproductive liberty in Amer-
ica." 9 Therefore reproductive liberty had to be reconceptualized, "to take into
account its relationship to racial oppression."' 0 Through painstaking historical
detail, Roberts convincingly connected the legacy of slavery to more recent at-
tempts to curtail black women's reproductive freedom, including legislative
proposals denying benefits for additional children born to welfare mothers and
the insertion of Norplant as a condition of receiving public assistance."
Shattered Bonds's arguments for family autonomy follow this pattern. Rob-
erts contends that the historical (and present) denial of black families' auton-
omy, both during and after slavery, set the stage for the easy disruption of black
families by the child welfare system. One cannot understand what is at stake for
Roberts without understanding the historical role of the state in the systematic
destruction of black family autonomy; indeed, this understanding is necessary
for any study of the African American family.12 In his last book, Shades of
Freedom, the late A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. formulated what he called the
"Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence."' 13 On that list was slavery
jurisprudence's conception of and attitude toward the black family. This juris-
7. Id. at ix.
8. Id.
9. BLACK BODY, supra note 2, at 6 (emphasis removed).
10. Id. at 6 (emphasis removed).
11. Especially in chapters 3 and 5. Id., at 104-149, 202-245.
12. See, e.g., ANDREW BILLINGSLEY, CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES (1993) (arguing that the autonomy and independence of the black family
were compromised by the institution of slavery); PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 81-166 (1997) (same); E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY
IN THE UNITED STATES (THE AFRICAN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE) (1948) (same); MARIE
JENKINS SCHWARTZ, BORN IN BONDAGE: GROWING UP ENSLAVED IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (2001)
(same).
13. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 195-206 (1996) [hereinafter SHADES OF FREEDOM].
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prudence commanded that the slave state, "[r]ecognize no rights of the black
family, destroy the unity of the black family, deny slaves the right of marriage;
demean and degrade black women, black men, black parents, and black chil-
dren; and then condemn them for their conduct and state of mind."14 While
Roberts does not explicitly address Higginbotham's precepts, the historical leg-
acy of slavery and the attendant lack of black family autonomy fuels her out-
rage at the child welfare system: "The American regime of slavery reveals bet-
ter than any other example the political function of repressing family
autonomy."' 
5
This book note will proceed in three Sections, each Section corresponding
to the three major parts of Roberts's book. The first will describe Roberts's
quantitative demonstration of the racial disparity in the child welfare system
and her evidence that it is a racist institution. The second will examine her as-
sessment of recent changes in child welfare policy and challenge her defense of
family preservation in light of scholarship regarding feminism and the criminal
law. The third Section will evaluate her argument that the racial disparities in
the child welfare system inflict harm on the black community as a whole, while
also addressing her policy prescriptions for the child welfare system.
I. REASONING FROM NUMBERS: THE MEANING OF RACIAL DISPARITY
Roberts's argument begins by documenting the "staggering"' 16 disparity in
the child welfare system. Although black children currently account for only
17% of the nation's youth, they constitute 42% of all children in foster care na-
tionwide. 17 The statistics in many of our states and larger cities are even more
startling. In Illinois, black children are 19% of the child population, but com-
prise over 75% of all children in foster care. 18 In Chicago, black children con-
stitute over 95% of the foster care population. 19 While black children represent
only 10% of the child population in San Francisco, they make up over 70% of
20
the city's foster care population. In New York City, white children are 30% of
the child population, but comprise less than 3% of the city's foster care popula-
21tion. More shocking is the disparity in the chances of white and black chil-
dren ending up in foster care. In New York City, white children have a one in
385 chance of being placed in foster care, compared to one in twenty-two for
22black children. In Central Harlem, one of the poorest census tracts in New
14. Id. at 196.
15. SHATrERED BoNDs, supra note 4, at 233.
16. Id. at6.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 9.
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York City, a black child has a one in ten chance of being removed from her
home.23 These numbers are verified by Roberts's personal experience: "Spend
a day at dependency court in any major city and you will see the unmistakable
color of the child welfare system."
24
The extent of the racial disparity, alone, in the child welfare system might
lead one to believe that racial discrimination and bias are at work in family
separations. According to Roberts, this suspicion is verified by the fact that
black children are treated differently than white children at almost every step of
the process. Black children are less likely than white children to receive in-
home services that often prevent the removal of their children. Indeed, 56% of
black children in the child welfare system--"twice the percentage of white
25children"--have been placed in foster care. Further, black children receive
servces"26
"inferior services" while in the child welfare system. Roberts cites a U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services study showing that among families
with "housing problems," whites are almost twice as likely as blacks to receive
housing services-43% versus 25%.27 Meanwhile, studies of the California
foster care system show that black children are less likely to receive mental
28health treatment. Finally, black children are more likely to be placed in "in-
stitutions" for mental treatment rather than in foster care or other home place-
ment.29
Roberts moves from demonstrating the stark racial disparities in the child
welfare system to seeking out the causes of these disparities. She correlates
much of the disproportionate rate of black involvement in the child welfare
system to the overrepresentation of blacks in the ranks of the poor, and the
overrepresentation of the poor in the child welfare system.30 There are "sepa-
rate [child welfare] systems for poor and for wealthier families" 31; while child
maltreatment in wealthier families is treated as a private matter, public systems
are reserved for poor families. "Poverty-not the type or severity of maltreat-
ment-is the single most important predictor of placement in foster care and
the amount of time spent there."
32
While conceding that poor people may be more likely to engage in child
maltreatment, Roberts argues that it is far easier to detect child maltreatment
because of prior involvement in state welfare systems, and that maltreatment is
23. Id.
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id. at21.
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27.
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often defined by parental poverty.33 She maintains that neglect as a form of
child maltreatment is best classified as "defined by poverty rather than...
caused by poverty." 34 Thus when a family is found to be neglectful, "it usually
has to do with them being poor. ' 35 She declares that the child welfare system is
"designed to detect and punish the neglect on the part of poor parents and to
ignore most middle-class failings. 36
For Roberts, the overrepresentation of the poor in the child welfare system
translates into black overrepresentation because of the overrepresentation of
blacks among the poor. The rates of black child poverty make black families
especially vulnerable to involvement in the child welfare system. Strikingly,
while about 70% of Black children have ever lived in poverty while growing
up, almost the same percentage of non-Black children have never experienced
poverty.37 Further, "Black children are the most likely of any group to live in
38 ,39very poor neighborhoods," a "geographical concentration, which contrib-
utes to the inequity of the child welfare system and "is intensifying in some
cities. Reciting this and other data, Roberts concludes that poverty is the sin-
gle biggest explanation of black child overrepresentation in the child welfare
system.
Roberts briefly considers other racially based explanations of the overrepre-
sentation of blacks in child welfare, including racial and cultural bias. She cites
studies that demonstrate that bias exists in the initial reporting stages of child
maltreatment.41 She argues that "for many caseworkers" the model family is "a
white, middle-class family composed of married parents and their children"--
42which black culture often violates, without any actual harm to the children.
She further cites the disparity between the detection and punishment of black
43
and white mothers who are substance abusers. However, the presence or
absence of incidents of bias are not central to Roberts's indictment of the child
welfare system: "[E]ven without definitive proof of racial bias ... it is accurate
to say that the overrepresentation of Black children in the child welfare system
results from racism.
' 4
Because Roberts believes that poverty is the single biggest explanatory
33. Id. at 29-44.
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 33.




41. Id. at 50 (discussing a study demonstrating racial disparity in the reporting of abusive head
trauma).
42. Id. at 59.
43. Id. at 62-63.
44. Id. at 47.
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factor in black children's involvement in the child welfare system, she argues
that the system's biggest flaw is its focus on the punishment of parents, rather
than the support of families in crisis. She contends that the child welfare system
has become merely a child protection system, "protect[ing] children from the
effects of society's colossal failure to care enough about children's welfare. 45
The child welfare system's-punitive policies are premised upon the "privatiza-
tion" of social responsibility for the well-being of children. "The child welfare
system is built upon the presumption that children's basic needs... must and
can be met solely by parents.' '46 Roberts argues that there are three defects in
the protection approach versus the welfare approach to child services: (1) "[I]t
places all responsibility for taking care of children on their parents," ignoring
how society often prevents parents from meeting that responsibility; (2) it "is
activated only when families are already in crisis[," when aid to prevent a cri-
sis would be more effective; and (3) "state intervention is punitive in nature." 4
7
Roberts has moved far beyond an indictment of a racially biased child wel-
fare system; her indictment is now aimed at the "systemic biases against Black
Americans" that are both a cause of and evidenced in the disparities in the child
48welfare system. She argues, "State disruption of families is one symptom of
this institutionalized discrimination. It reflects the persistent gulf between the
material welfare of Black and white children in America. The racial disparity in
the child welfare system-even if related directly to economic inequality-ul-
timately results from racial injustice. ' 49
Roberts's arguments mirror the arguments made by critics of the racial dis-
parities in the ever-increasing prison population in the United States.5° Marc
Mauer has wondered if society would consider it acceptable if most prisoners
were white, instead of half the prison population being black, and another 17%
being Latinos.5 ' While the system's racial disparity is troubling to Roberts,
what seems most appalling is society's privatization of the causes of black
child involvement in child welfare. Roberts's outrage is based on the fact that
systemic failures have been internalized as the private pathologies of the poor,
even as the child welfare system is unleashed to destroy any semblance of pri-
vacy and autonomy these families might enjoy. Indeed, their private patholo-
gies are then used as justification for destroying any autonomy.
Roberts is correct to point out that the problems of the black poor would not
be so perceived if whites were disproportionately poor. Economist Glenn Loury
argues that the public silence about the incarceration rate of young, black men
45. Id. at 74
46. Id. at 89.
47. Id. at 89-91.
48. Id. at 94.
49. Id. at 95.
50. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 1, at 118-41; TONRY, supra note 1, at 3-51.
51. MAUER, supranote 1, at 12, 118.
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suggests a belief that "the problem here lies with THEM and not-as is, in fact,
the case-with ALL OF US." 52 Society's silence about child welfare is not only
evidence of societal neglect of black family disruption, but this silence also
causes such disruption.
Roberts seeks to invert the privatization of the problems that poor black
families face, endeavoring to inject them into the-public's agenda. While I be-
lieve she is largely correct on this score, she does not adequately address the
concern (rational or not) of how much child neglect is caused by parental drug
abuse. Thus she never tackles the most troubling aspects of concluding that
poverty is the single-biggest explanatory factor in family disruption. She does
not address statistics that show that parental substance abuse is a direct cause of
the explosion of child welfare cases in recent years. 53 More importantly, she
does not make the case for why it might be irrational to separate the conse-
quences of poverty from substance abuse. These arguments are necessary for
those who seek correction of overreactions to the drug problem. Further, even if
Roberts is correct on these issues, it is uncertain what we ought to do in the
meantime.
II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF FAMILY AND THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
The second part of the book directly addresses the policy of child welfare
through an assessment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA).54 Roberts's central purpose here is to reject the legislation's emphasis
on adoption as a solution to the foster care crisis. Instead, she argues for in-
creased emphasis on family preservation efforts to assist families in avoiding
the crises that lead to child maltreatment. Responding to the claims that this ap-
proach has failed, she demonstrates that this approach has never really been
tried.
Roberts's central complaint with the ASFA lies in its presumption that
"children's right to be safe [was] in opposition to parents' right to custody of
their children." 55 Both adults and children "have an interest in family integ-
rity.''56 The oppositional paradigm, which undergirds the ASFA, is evidenced
by two provisions that undermine the possibility of family preservation: (1)
swifter timetables for terminating rights of biological parents; and (2) concur-
rent permanency planning. Each of these policies, Roberts argues, is designed
52. GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 80-84 (2002).
53. Studies conducted by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) show
that 70-80% of the caseload of child protective services included parents who are abusing drugs, alco-
hol, or both. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT,
AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 67-81 (1999).
54. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
55. SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 3, at 108.
56. Id.
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to free up more children for adoption.
Adoption stands out as the target of the second section of Roberts's argu-
ment against the child welfare system. I will address Roberts's arguments
against adoption at the policy level here, and leave her political/social criti-
cisms to the next section. At the policy level, Roberts argues that the current
push for adoption (by the quick termination of parental rights) cannot solve the
problems of the explosion of children in the foster care system. Further, she ar-
gues that the push toward adoption at the national level manifests a rejection of
"any national effort to address the systemic causes of children's deprivation
and... [a decision to] pursue instead the private remedies of marriage and
adoption. '57 Adoption becomes merely another form of the privatization of the
social problems and challenges facing poor families.
While Roberts's critique of the "adoption alternative" is the central argu-
ment of the book's second section, she also provides a defense of family pres-
ervation efforts. She defines family preservation efforts as those steps taken "to
prevent the need to remove maltreated children from their homes and to reunite
children in foster care with their families., 58 Family preservation is premised
upon the belief that governmental intrusions are able to destroy families, and
seeks to "minimize [such intrusions'] destructive impact., 59
Why is family preservation such an important goal for Roberts? It is par-
tially her (correct) belief that many of the problems that result in child mal-
treatment and removal of children from their families could be solved through
programs aimed at root causes, such as joblessness, poverty, and income insta-
bility. However, this author believes that Roberts goes even further, by defin-
ing, to some degree, the well-being of children as family preservation. Rob-
erts's animosity toward the child welfare system is motivated, in part, by her
belief that it has defined an oppositional relationship between the interests of
parent and child, despite the fact that foster children "continue to value ties to
their [natural] parents despite the physical separation and despite the reasons
for removal. 6 °
While Roberts is correct in her argument that the child welfare system's
emphasis on the quick termination of parental rights may rest on an under-
valuation of family bonds, it is unrealistic to assume that there are never in-
stances where these interests collide. Her collapse of children's well-being into
family preservation favors outcomes that may not be in the best interests of the
child. This is evident in Roberts's rejection of the ASFA's recognition that
foster and pre-adoptive parents might have an interest in custody hearings.61
57. Id. at 117.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 159.
61. Id. at 120.
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She believes that giving pre-adoptive parents the opportunity to participate in
custody hearings unfairly disadvantages biological parents because of differ-
ences of class and race.62 It appears that the presence of an additional voice
speaking in the child's independent interest is also problematic to her. While
pre-adoptive parents may not always represent the best interests of the child,
63
it is crucial to realize that the child's interests are not simply synonymous with
the biological parents' interests in the way that Roberts seems to believe.
Roberts's collapse of the interests of parent and child is clearest on the
subject of substance-abusing parents. While she concedes that "[s]ubstance
abuse interferes with parenting and can make parents dangerous to their chil-
dren," she believes that "offering intensive family preservation services and
drug treatment is safer, more stable, and less traumatic for children than placing
them... in the foster care system."'64 This statement is problematic in light of
later statements regarding the long road to recovery from substance abuse. She
65states that it takes at least two years, often with frequent relapses. While one
might support her contention that the termination of parental rights should take
into account the difficulty of recovery from addiction, it does not follow that a
child should not be removed from such an environment. She states that "parents
so deep into drugs or alcohol that they have abandoned their children should
not be permitted to stall efforts to place the children with adoptive families,"
66
but they "appear to represent a minority of [substance-abusing] parents." 67
While I am grateful for some stopping point for her reasoning, the very vague-
ness of the point raises doubts about whether anything but the most extreme
forms of neglect would be grounds to move with confidence toward a termina-
tion of the parent-child relationship.
68
By collapsing the value of family preservation into the determination of the
child's best interests, Roberts successfully privatizes the family relationships of
poor, black children. This privatization is an inversion of the destruction of pri-
vacy and autonomy of black families. Against the backdrop of America's racial
history, such a recovery of black families' privacy and autonomy ought to be
looked upon as a triumph.
However this triumph is not without complication. The recovery of privacy
places Roberts in conflict with principles central to the feminist theory-the
62. Id. at 120-21, 169-71.
63. Id. at 166 ("Adoption policy has historically tracked the market for children, serving the inter-
ests of adults seeking to adopt more than the interests of children needing stable homes.").
64. Id. at 139.
65. Id. at 154-57.
66. Id. at 157.
67. Id.
68. This is all the more troubling when one considers statistics about the relationship between pa-
rental drug use and child involvement in foster care. For instance, Bartholet notes that "a study found
that in almost three-quarters of New York City's cases of child abuse fatalities, one or both parents were
drug-addicted." BARTHOLET, supra note 53, at 75.
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destruction of the family's "sacred" position as private, cordoned off from the
scrutiny of the public or the political. 69 The conception of privacy as in opposi-
tion to women's safety and equality is explored in detail by Professor Reva
Siegel, who has argued that marital privacy arose to replace the outmoded prin-
ciple of marital unity that granted the husband the right to beat his wife without
the law's interference. 70 Courts reasoned that it was "better to draw the curtain,
shut out the public gaze [from domestic violence], and leave the parties to for-
get and forgive." 71 While it would be unfair to conclude that Roberts is guilty
of so fundamental a disregard for the well-being of children as presented above,
her construction of the privatized family existing in parent-child unity, which
legalizes all but the most egregious harms, raises serious questions that she fails
to address.
Roberts's championing of privacy rights is distinctly affected by race and
class considerations. The discrimination inherent in the history of the recogni-
tion of rights to family autonomy and privacy requires that we not simply reject
these rights as oppressive.72 Privacy rights and rights to family autonomy create
the necessary boundaries to protect people and allow communities to flourish.
The denial of such rights inflicted harm on blacks as a group. The cognizance
of the inherent racial and class privilege attendant in rights recognition makes
Roberts's position all the more worthy. Recognition of this racialized history of
privacy protections has resulted in the need to make an affirmative case for the
protection of privacy for black families. The right of privacy, in contradistinc-
tion to the oppressive interpretation given by Siegel, advances the cause of
equality.
73
While one might laud Roberts's efforts to privatize the black family against
state intrusion, this privatization is complicated by her efforts to unify the inter-
ests of black parents and children in maltreatment cases. This has the problem-
atic effect of potentially undervaluing the effects of neglect on black children.
Against the history of the denial of privacy and autonomy for black families is
69. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117 (1996). See also ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATrERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 87
(2000) ("The notion of marital privacy has been a source of oppression to battered women and has
helped to perpetuate women's subordination within the family."). But see ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY
ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988) (arguing that a feminist case can be made for
privacy, beyond abortion rights, based on the ideals of personhood and equality).
70. Siegel, supra note 69, at 2168-69.
71. Id.at2169.
72. Siegel points out that the eradication of the right of chastisement has often been racialized. Id.
at 2136-39 (noting that Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871), and Harris v. State, 14 So. 266 (Miss.
1894), two early cases that denied the right of chastisement, involved black couples in Southern states,
leading one to suspect that they were motivated more by disrespect for the husband than respect for the
wife).
73. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991).
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what Professor Randall Kennedy calls the "history of unequal protection."
74
Kennedy argues that the history of unequal protection of the black community
against crime should also be figured into the history of denials of privacy
rights. 75 Roberts's claims of the over-enforcement of punitive child welfare
policies do not adequately respond to those who believe that the interests of
children cannot be collapsed into those of the parent. As the literature on do-
mestic abuse has shown, it is significantly important that we not reject out of
hand the possibility that the parent-child relationship might be one in which
parents' interests and children's interests are at odds.
Roberts's response to critics about the place of children's rights in her
analysis is unfortunately unpersuasive. While asserting that she is not making
the case that black children should never be removed from their families, she
argues that the attempt to "[f]ram[e] the assault on family preservation in terms
of children's rights masks the battles between other political interests., 76 In-
stead she argues that "[t]he rights of Black children must be interpreted in the
context of racial oppression."
7 7
Roberts is correct to note the hypocrisy of a society that purports to protect
children from their parents' harm, but refuses to protect them (and their fami-
lies) from the circumstances that make this harm more likely. This, standing
alone, constitutes an abdication of moral responsibility that raises the question
of a willful neglect. This may even substantiate Roberts's claim of racism.
However, Roberts argues as if all this negates the reality that protecting chil-
dren, at the moment they need protection, must be given a high priority. Rob-
erts's arguments would have us believe that we can avoid making decisions
amid tragedy of the sort that produce too many cases of child neglect and
abuse. Nevertheless, these tragic situations simply make our choices to inter-
vene in already troubled families all the more tragic. While there ought to be a
collective mourning about the societal neglect that brings us to such a "tragic
choice," the choices to intervene in black families must sometimes be made,
and more often, I regret, than Roberts concedes.
III. REASONING FROM HISTORY: THE MEANING OF RACIAL STIGMA
In the last (and perhaps most provocative) section, Roberts discusses the
74. Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARv. L. REv. 1255, 1259 (1994) (arguing that the fact that controversial policies, such as sentencing
disparities for the possession of crack cocaine versus powder cocaine, "are supported and enforced
by... African Americans" demands a "reconsideration" of the meaning of disparate racial impact).
75. For instance, Roberts's analysis of the disparate impact of drug enforcement against pregnant
mothers ignores the problem of underprotection of the law. She complains that "Black women are far
more likely to be reported for prenatal substance abuse and to have their newborns placed in out-of-
home care." SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 3, at 51. But if the racial demographics were reversed, then
one would rightly suspect that black babies were being deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
76. Id. at 257.
77. Id.
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child welfare system's racial harm to the black community as a whole. Roberts
argues that the system inflicts a group harm in two ways: (1) its "massive state
supervision and dissolution" of black families, represented by the racial dis-
parities in the child welfare system; and (2) its role in maintaining black disad-
vantage.
78
Roberts views the earliest Supreme Court cases protecting family rights in
historical context as safeguarding "the ability of minority groups to socialize
their children according to their own standards. 79 The racial disparities present
in the child welfare system suggest that black families are being denied that
right to family autonomy. Family autonomy, Roberts contends, is "as meaning-
ful and precious as the freedom to organize with others for political ends. 8 °
The denial of family autonomy is, then, a political harm.
Roberts argues that all blacks share a connection, so that damage done to
one affects all, relying on the research of Michael Dawson. While Dawson
suggests that blacks make political decisions about their best interests by taking
into account the interests of the larger black community, he does not make the
claim that these calculations are themselves correct or reasonable. The fact that
blacks see themselves as connected does not mean that what happens to some
subset of the black community necessarily affects all other blacks. Further,
Roberts suggests that "what happens to individual parents and families in the
child welfare system ... depends on the economic well-being of Black Ameri-
cans and the public's view of Black family fitness." 82 The suggestion that
blacks share one economic position ignores the economic diversity within the
black community.
83
She also focuses on the group harms of the overrepresentation of black
children in the child welfare system. This harm manifests itself in many differ-
ent ways for Roberts. The dissolution of black families robs the black commu-
nity of a particular "oppositional enclave," 84 which preserves culture and fos-
ters resistance. The dissolution of black families further erodes social capital
and "undermines Black people's ability to struggle against the many forms of
institutional discrimination that persist in this country."85 Finally, and most sig-
nificant for Roberts's argument, the disruption of black families "replicates the
78. Id. at 225.
79. Id. at 226 (discussing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
80. Id. at 227.
81. MICHAEL C. DAwsoN, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS
3-44 (1994).
82. SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 4, at 232.
83. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN
AMERICA'S "RACIAL" CRISIS 17-51 (1997) (highlighting the gulf between poor and middle class
blacks).
84. SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 3, at 237.
85. Id. at 239.
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notion created in chattel slavery that there is no such thing as a Black family."86
This negative message in turn justifies "the most destructive incidents of racial
injustice. ,87
As might now be suspected, Roberts's objection to the strong advocacy for
transracial adoption is premised upon, among other things, the message that it
sends about the black community. Roberts's criticisms of the "adoption alter-
native" do not stop at the policy level, but extend to a critique of the racial ef-
fects of the adoption push, and its meaning at a social and political level. Rob-
erts argues that the increased advocacy of adoption alternatives is motivated by
"society's depreciation of the relationship between poor parents and their chil-
dren, especially those who are Black." 88 The adoption push raises additional
concerns of racial inequity and injustice, because they often pit the interests of
a poor black family against those of middle-class whites. Roberts connects the
ASFA's preference for speedy termination of parental rights and its advocacy
for adoption to "the growing movement to remove barriers to adoption of Black
children by white middle-class couples.,
89
Moreover, the push toward transracial adoption raises the perception of
black parental and communal unfitness for taking care of black children: "[T]he
rhetoric promoting transracial adoption supports the dissolution of poor Black
families by depicting adoptive homes as superior to children's existing family
relationships." 90 She interprets the move to restrict the use of race in adoption
as merely "an effort to increase the supply of children for whites who want to
adopt"91-regardless of the best interests of the child. She correctly points out
the contradiction when states are forbidden to take race into account when
white parents want children of another race, while states are allowed to meet
the racial desires of white parents who seek to adopt only white children. She
justifiably notes that there has been no outcry against this type of "race-
matching" to meet whites' private desires.
92
Roberts's solution to this problem, modeled after a similar program admin-
istered among Native Americans, is to shift control over child welfare to the
black communities. She believes this will reduce the role that the white-
dominated welfare system has in black family and community life. 93 Citing
proposals by Professors Andrew Billingsley and Jeanne Giovannoni, Roberts
argues that community participation in child welfare decisions could be tied to
existing service organizations within the black community, such as the Urban
86. Id. at 244.
87. Id. at 245.
88. Id. at 120.
89. Id. at 165.
90. Id. at 172.
91. Id. at 166.
92. Id. at 167.
93. Id. at 273.
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League.
94
Roberts's solution to white domination in child welfare might, ironically,
have the effect of leaving poor black families just as dominated and without
any more autonomy and privacy. Instead of being dominated by white, middle-
class professionals, they might find themselves dominated by a black elite.
Roberts inappropriately collapses the interests of the black community into an
undifferentiated mass. There is no reason to think, a priori, that middle-class
blacks, who people organizations like the Urban League, would not have the
same depreciation for single, poor black women, even as they advocate for in-
creased social spending. Many blacks have responded to racial stereotypes by
practicing a "politics of respectability" to distinguish between "good" and
"bad" blacks.95 With regard to gay and lesbian political movements, political
scientist Cathy Cohen has argued that the power to regulate "deviant" members
of marginal groups, and to define legitimate members of marginal groups, is
"increasingly exercised by the more privileged members of such groups."
96
Cohen argues that marginal group "managers" police the public image of their
respective groups.97
The problems raised by Roberts's policy proposal are connected to the gen-
eral challenges raised by Roberts's use of history. The use of history does not
adjudicate the value choices that we must inevitably make in the area of child
welfare policy. While Roberts discusses a history of over-intrusiveness with re-
spect to black family autonomy, Kennedy finds a history of unequal protection.
What each finds in the historical narrative is dictated largely by pre-existing
value commitments. Moreover, the use of history, particularly slavery, raises
the question of whether today's problems are analogizable to that era. The fact
that family disruption occurred during slavery, and was an expression of white
racism, does not necessarily mean that any current family disruption is
grounded in the same soil. Additionally, this does not take seriously the wide-
spread advances that blacks have made as policymakers at all levels of gov-
ernment.
98
Finally, while ultimately necessary, reasoning from history is fraught with
challenges that Roberts does not to address. More fundamentally, reasoning
from slavery is necessary as well. The beliefs about racial hierarchy that persist
in American political culture have their origins in the experience of racial slav-
94. ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIONANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK
CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE 215 (1972) (arguing that racism pervades the system of
child welfare).
95. KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 17.
96. Cathy J. Cohen, Straight Gay Politics: The Limits of an Ethnic Model of Inclusion, in
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 572 (lan Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997).
97. Id. at 576.
98. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 1, at 132 ("[Iln some jurisdictions a significant number of prose-
cutors and judges are minorities prosecuting and sentencing other minorities to terms of incarcera-
tion.").
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ery. Glenn Loury argues that a group is stigmatized "when it can experience an
alarming disparity in some social indicators, and yet the disparity occasion no
societal reflection upon the extent to which that circumstance signals something
having gone awry in OUR structures rather than... in THEIRS." 99 The profound
"otherness" of blacks in America finds its roots in the experience of slavery. 100
Roberts's Shattered Bonds forces us to have a conversation with the manifesta-
tions of that legacy in the child welfare system. Perhaps the greatest problem
with Roberts's book, as with some of her proposals, is that it is about so much
more than child welfare. This is, I believe, also its greatest strength.
99. LOURY, supra note 52, at 83.
100. Loury's conception of "racial stigma" finds its meaning in the "lingering residue in post-
slavery American political culture of the dishonor engendered by racial slavery." Id. at 70. The history
of this profound otherness, and its protection and enshrinement in the law, was central to the work of
the late A. Leon Higginbotham. See generallv A. Leon Higginbotham, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 13.
